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BALANCE-OF-POWER DIPLOMACY IN NEW MEXICO:
GOVERNOR FERNANDO DE LA CONCHA AND THE
INDIAN POLICY OF CONCILIATION

JACK AUGUST

IN

TIlE LAST QUARTER of the eighteenth century, hostile Indian
groups, rather than rival European powers, threatened Spain's
northern Mexican possessions. Spanish New Mexicans, beleaguered by constant warfare, lived under frightening conditions;
Comanches terrorized in all directions, Apaches raided from the
south and west, and Utes and Navajos attacked from the north and
west. By the late 1780s, the Spanish policy of hispanicizing
nomadic Indians was subordinated to the needs of securing peace
with them. Moreover, New Mexico held strategic military importance for royal administrators. As early as 1777, Commandant
General of the Provincias Internas Teodoro de Croix warned: "If
we lose the important barrier of New Mexico, which I pray God
may not happen, the Indians would be masters of that immense
country, and accustomed to living by robbery would indubitably
approach us." 1
Ten years after that warning, an obscure army officer, Don Fernando de la Concha, became governor of New Mexico. Although
the remote province had a long history of incessant warfare with
the tribes around it, Concha, during his term of office (17871793), guided the province through a reversal of this trend and
into a period of conciliation with the Indians. His imaginative use
of balance-of-power diplomacy consolidated peace with troublesome Indian groups and effected a decade of stability and modest
economic prosperity in New Mexico. 2
Between Croix's warning and Concha's tenure in Santa Fe, a
celebrated mestizo frontiersman, Juan Bautista de Anza, served as
governor of New Mexico. From 1778 until 1787, Anza subjugated
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and forged peace treaties with most of the hostile tribes in the
province. After this period of aggressive military and diplomatic
activity, Spaniards enjoyed an unprecedented period of peace
with the Indians of the northern frontier. Indeed during the postAnza decade, mines opened, ranches dotted the landscape, and a
lively profitable trade emerged among the peoples of New Mexico. 3
Concha inherited an Indian policy that had its origins in a vast
political and military reorganization of Spain's northern frontier.
Commandant General Croix, who had hoped to prosecute offensive warfare against troublesome Indian groups, was forced to
abandon this policy when the Spanish crown decided to aid the
American colonists in their revolt against England. Under these
circumstances, Minister of the Indies Jose de Galvez ordered Croix
to develop a policy of conciliation and military retrenchment
along the northern frontier. The idea of conciliation, first proposed in 1763 with the cession of Louisiana, and revived by the
Marques de Rubi in 1771, became a fiscal necessity in 1779. 4
In New Mexico the provincial capital at Santa Fe was selected
as a base for dealing with hostile Comanches, Utes, Navajos and
Apaches. Croix argued that peace and stability on the frontier
could be attained by dealing with the tribes individually, overlooking petty offenses, playing upon mutual animosities, and preventing the formation of alliances. Although this policy was not
what Croix wanted, Spain's changing priorities left the commandant general with few other options. To Croix, forced to refrain
from open warfare, the policy seemed practical, judicious, and,
importantly, inexpensive. 5
Within the framework of Croix's policy of conciliation and
retrenchment, Governor Juan Bautista de Anza's accomplishments in Indian affairs were remarkable. In contrast to the peaceful diplomacy Croix's directives implied, Anza spent most of his
first two years of office in extensive military campaigns, concentrating his efforts on the powerful Comanches. By the mid-1780s,
with the aid of Pueblo Indian auxiliaries, Anza had subjugated the
Comanches and succeeded in forging an alliance with them.
Meanwhile, he had reconciled them with one of their bitterest
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enemies, the Utes, and enticed both groups into a triple alliance
with the Spaniards against the Apaches. The Spanish-ComancheUte alliance eventually forced the Navajos to dissolve their fifteenyear alliance with the Gila Apaches and subsequently to declare
war on their former friends and allies. 6
By 1786 conditions had changed for the better in New Mexico.
Spain's participation in the American Revolutionary War had
ended, new and much better weapons had reached the frontier,
and a seemingly lasting peace had been established with the Comanches. 7 Moreover, the presidial force at Santa Fe had grown
from 80 to 119 and population in the province increased to nearly
21,000. Anza, who had already allied the Pueblos and Jicarilla
Apaches with the Spanish, could count on the newly acquired
allies-the Comanches and Utes-to move against the greatly disunified but implacable enemy, the Apaches. 8
The year 1786 saw another modification of defensive strategy
for the Interior Provinces. This change centralized colonial administration, and the Interior Provinces were returned to the
supreme jurisdiction of the viceroy. The king ordered that New
Spain be reorganized into twelve intendancies, New Mexico
becoming part of the Provincias del Poniente. More importantly,
the change in administration that returned command of the northern provinces to the viceroy brought them under the capable hand
of Bernardo de Galvez. Though Galvez died during his second
year as viceroy, he relied on his years of frontier experience in
Indian affairs in creating a specific program. When Concha
assumed office in 1787, it was the Indian policy.of Bernardo de
Galvez that he followed.
The viceroy's plan was not entirely new. He synthesized the experiences of past administrators into a practical and workable formula. In New Mexico there would be no truce with the Apaches;
they would have to choose peace or war. The first phase of this
program entailed a concerted military effort to force the Apaches
to settle near presidios. Then Galvez hoped to suppress raiding,
obliterate social and economic traditions, and destroy the entire
cultural core of tribal organization. In his instructions to the commandant generals and governors, Galvez summarized the nature
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of his plan by stating that the Indians "may be attracted gently to
the advantages of rational life and to commerce by discreet and
opportune gifts. If peace is broken. . . we should rightly return to
incessant and harsh war, alternating war and peace as often as the
haughty or humble behavior of the barbarous Indian requires."9
Galvez was also cognizant of the economic nature of the
Apache raiding pattern. He proposed either to feed the Apaches or
destroy them, adding: "I am very much in favor of the special
ruination of the Apaches, and in endeavoring to interest the other
tribes and even other Apache bands in it, because these Indians
are our real enemies in the Provincias Internas; they cause its
desolation and are the most feared because of their knowledge,
cunning, and warlike customs (acquired in the necessity of robbing in order to live) and their number." I 0
Bernardo de Galvez's policy coincided with Anza's last year in
New Mexico. Anza's treaties with the Comanches, Navajos, and
Utes stipulated that they were to maintain peace with the Spaniards and Pueblo Indians and to aid in Spanish campaigns against
the Apaches. He granted peace, trading privileges in New Mexico,
and military support against the common enemy. During the final
year of his administration, Anza succeeded in persuading each of
the three tribes to elect a man who would be responsible for their
leadership and conduct. 1I Despite such remarkable progress, the·
Apache menace did not subside.
The situation looked optimistic when on 3 November 1786 Don
Fernando Sim6n Ignacio de la Concha was appointed governor of
New Mexico. Born 27 February 1744 near the town of Villa Carriedo, Santander, Spain, Concha entered the Spanish navy in 1757
when only thirteen years old. He reached the rank of lieutenant by
the time he was eighteen, but transferred to the army where he
became captain in 1770. Thereafter he rose quickly through the
ranks: lieutenant colonel in 1783, sergeant major of the Provincial
Infantry of Campeche in 1785, and colonel of infantry in the
Army of New Castile in 1791. Concha, a veteran soldier, took
possession of the governor's office on 25 August 1787 and immediately undertook the task of consolidating the peace treaties and
alliances Anza had made with the Indians. 12
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After arriving in Santa Fe Concha worked for three months with
Anza mastering the complexities of the Indian alliances before
taking charge of the province on IONovember 1787. The new
governor took office during a sensitive period, for recently formed
alliances had not yet stood the test of time, and Anza's departure
could upset them. Fortunately for Spanish New Mexicans, Concha
proved an adept student of Indian diplomacy.13 Early during his
tenure he informed Commandant General Jacobo Ugarte that he
had assured the continuation of peace with the Comanches and
had been able to maintain the Ute and Navajo alliances. 14
Recognizing that the Comanches "were the most powerful and
consequently the most feared" tribe, Concha made their continued friendship his first priority. Since his arrival in the province, he had observed that the Comanches had demonstrated good
faith, shown interest in commerce, and offered military assistance
to the Spanish. The governor reported that Comanche Chief
Ecueracapa and many Comanche sub-chiefs had visited him and
had attended several trade fairs in Taos, Pecos, and Picuris. They
had responded readily when called on to campaign against.
Apaches, either alone or with an expedition. Relations with the
Comanches made Concha optimistic. In November 1787 he wrote
. the commandant general that '.'the disposition of the Comanche
Nation is such that it will embrace any proposal made to them
with gentleness, affection, and a few gifts. . . ."15
Not all aspects of the Comanche alliance, however, were perfect. During the period of gubernatorial transition, a group of
Santa Fe presidials, settlers, Pueblo auxiliaries, and Comanche
warriors made an unsuccessful campaign against the Gila
Apaches. A battle ensued with the Apaches gaining the upper
hand. The Comanches soon found themselves abandoned by their
erstwhile allies and suffered a humiliating defeat. One month
later, when asked to participate in another campaign south of
Zuni, the Comanche warriors agreed but were somewhat skeptical. As the expedition neared the Apache rancherias, the Comanches suspected that they would again be expected to lead the
attack and stated that they had no confidence in their allies' support. Insulted, expedition leader Commandant Inspector Joseph
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Rengel told the Comanches that the Spaniards would lead the
assault and that the Comanche warriors accompanying the expedition were superfluous. The attack scattered the Apaches and
reassured Comanches that Spanish troops would not flee under
fire. The alliance withstood its first moderate test. 16
Early in his administration, Concha was confident enough to
press the Comanches for further concessions. During previous military campaigns Comanche warriors had practiced unsavory and
sordid excesses of warfare. When they captured enemies they immediately executed all adult males and offered to ransom women
and youths of both sexes. Captives that were not ransomed became
Comanche slaves. Concha admonished the Comanches to cease
executing captives; those that could not be put to good use in or
around the Spanish settlements might eventually be returned to
their people. 17 The subsequent maintenance of the SpanishComanche alliance indicated that, to some degree, Concha's
stipulations were adhered to, for there is no evidence of further
disagreement between the two allies regarding warfare practices.
New Viceroy Antonio Florez and Commander General Ugarte
gave Concha a surprising amount of autonomy. The governor
steered the still nascent Comanche alliance along a moderate
course, refraining from actions that might jeopardize its continued success. Still the alliance had not experienced its most
severe test. A crippling drought hit the southern Plains in the fall
of 1787 and lasted well into the 1790s. The effects of the drought
could have strained the bonds of peace and friendship to the
breaking point, but Concha demonstrated keen political sense,
transforming a dangerous situation into a diplomatic victory for
the Spaniards.
The seriousness of the drought and the consequent famine produced extreme distress among the Indians of New Mexico. By the
autumn of 1787 it was clear that the great buffalo herds, the basis
of Comanche economy, had retreated from the southern Plains.
The scarcity of game forced Comanche warriors to spend their
time hunting rather than raiding the distant Apaches. In the first
year of the drought, between the fall of 1787 and the summer of
1788, no Apache campaigns were carried out, no Comanche trade
fairs were held in New Mexico, and some members of the tribe
perished from hunger.
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Concha averted mass starvation of the Comanches by sending
them corn through the summer of 1788. In June 1789, Comanche
Chief Ecueracapa led 180 of his people into Santa Fe to solicit aid
for themselves and for others who remained in the rancherias.
Concha responded by giving them 200 bushels of corn, while the
local citizenry donated another 160 bushels. Moreover, if game remained scarce, the governor recommended larger and more frequent gifts to relieve the starving Comanches. The commandant
general and the viceroy endorsed these actions and encouraged
Concha to assist the Comanches in every way possible as long as
necessary and at the expense of the Royal Treasury. To the viceroy,- maintenance of the peace was of primary importance, and he
was convinced that aiding the Comanches in their time of need
was proper use of royal funds. IS
Other Spanish governors had made peace with the Comanches,
but Concha was the first to maintain peace with them throughout
his term of office. Governor Tomas Velez Cachupin had
negotiated the first Spanish-Comanche peace treaty in New Mexico in 1762. But his successor, Governor Pedro Fermin de Mendinueta could not keep the peace, and by 1768 the tribe began
again to raid Spanish settlements. Fermin de Mendinueta concluded another peace pact in early 1771, only to have it shattered
two years later when 500 Comanches attacked the Spanish settlement of EI Valle. Between June and September 1774 Comanches
carried out five major raids in New Mexico. 19 After Ariza subjugated the Comanches, Concha faced a problem his predecessors
could not solve-maintaining peace with the powerful northern
nation. He proved equal to the task, for his prudent actions not
only maintained peace, but also strengthened the Comanche
alliance.
To maintain harmony with the Comanches, Concha recognized
that the tribe must remain at peace with Spain's other Indian
allies on the northern frontier. The Utes had continued their
alliance and friendship with the Spaniards, and with the governor's judicious use of diplomacy, the Ute-Comanche peace remained intact. 20 The governor understood the historical antipathy
between the two groups, realizing that both tribes had distinct interests and that the Utes were extremely jealous of the Comanches'
favored status. 21

Service Record of Don Fernando de la Concha. Courtesy of DonaldC. Cutter.
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Within the shaky Ute-Comanche peace, Ute jealousy and
rivalry caused Concha much consternation. Late in 1787, a small
group of Sahuahuana Utes stole twenty-six Comanche horses.
Concha urged Ute Chief Muguisachi to make restitution to the
Comanches, which was promptly done. The offended Comanches
were pleased with the governor's action and treated the Ute envoys well. 22 However, peaceful settlement of Ute-Comanche disputes was not always possible. In October 1789, Utes again stole
Comanche horses. This time Concha did not have time to intervene. In retaliation, Comanche warriors attacked a group of Utes
with such fury that they killed 80 of the lIZ-member band, including the chief. After this episode, Concha lamented that "it
would be difficult to see peace regained between the two groups
because of the perfidy of both nations." He hoped to avoid an open
war, "which would be difficult," but if war did break out between
the two tribes, the governor advocated a nonintervention policy.
However, the Ute-Comanche peace weathered this disruption,
and, for the most part, both tribes practiced friendly competition
throughout Concha's term as governor. The governor handled this
situation well, for he did not upset the precariously balanced
peace. 23
The Jicarillas did not cause the governor many problems. The
Comanches had driven the Jicarillas from Jicarilla Mountain into
an exposed position on the northeastern New Mexico frontier between the Apache-hating Comanches to the east and the Spanish
New Mexicans to the southwest. The exposed position of the Jicarillas predetermined their allegiance, for they depended almost entirely upon the Spaniards for their survival. Concha noted that
"the Jicarillas also do not have an interpreter assigned to them,
but as it is very much unusual to find anyone who cannot speak
some Castilian, it is not .difficult for one to understand them and to
clear up anything which may occur, without the necessity of that
kind of assistance."24
Like the Utes, the Jicarillas envied Comanche power as well as
the attention Spaniards paid them. At times Jicarillas joined Utes
to raid Comanche rancherias. Concha was responsible for returning stolen goods or animals to the Comanches and for restoring
peace between the tribes by reporting the incidents to Jicarilla and
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Ute leaders with the request that they punish offenders. Such
potentially dangerous infractions among the three groups occurred throughout his administration, but Concha maintained
good relations with and among the three tribes. 25 By diplomatically dispensing justice he kept the Indians peaceful and dependent on the Spaniards.
The Navajo nation to the west caused governor Concha a great
deal of concern. His predecessor had succeeded in bringing about
a truce, but had not really brought the Navajo into the Spanish
fold. The key to consolidating peace and alliance with the Navajos
involved gaining the friendship of Navajo Chief Antonio EI Pinto.
Although Spanish authorities recognized Chief Carlos as principal
chief of the Navajos, Antonio EI Pinto, a spirited and charismatic
leader, was more respected and influential.
Initially, Concha held a very low opinion of the Navajos. In the
fall of 1787 he chastised Chief Carlos for not living up to the
agreement made with Anza to furnish a monthly contingent of
warriors for use against Gila Apaches. 26 The old alliance between
Gilas and Navajos had not been fully broken, and many Navajos
joined Apaches on raids. Spanish officials suspected, in fact, that
EI Pinto had participated with Gila Apaches in raids on Janos and
Arispe in 1786. 27 Although EI Pinto denied the charges, officials
viewed him as the disruptive force in the Spanish-Navajo peace.
The Apaches sought to dissolve the Spanish-Navajo pact, and
royal officials became increasingly convinced that EI Pinto supported Apache aims. As a result, Commandant General Ugarte
ordered the arrest of the Navajo leader, and Governor Concha
reluctantly complied. The governor, closer to the situation and
more sensitive to the diplomatic ramifications of the arrest,
argued that no evidence existed to prove EI Pinto guilty of any
charges. Navajo leaders claimed, furthermore, that Antonio had
been arrested on the basis of rumors and urged Concha to free
him. The governor feared that detaining EI Pinto might endanger
the progress already made in securing the Navajo peace and questioned Ugarte's wisdom in the matter. 28
Ugarte relented and allowed Concha to use his judgment. While
incarcerated at Santa Fe, EI Pinto had behaved well, the Navajos
had adhered to the peace treaty, and EI Pinto and the governor
became friends. On 4 April 1788 Concha released the Navajo
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leader, and the two parted with expressions of "affection and
gratitude." In describing Antonio EI Pinto to Ugarte, Concha
wrote, "I believe to have made a faithful very useful ally who lives
near the lands of the enemy Apache, against whom you advise me
it is necessary to wage war with intensity. "29
Taking advantage of the opportunity, Governor Concha appointed one of his ablest officers, Lieutenant Vicente Troncoso, to
escort EI Pinto to his rancheda in the Cebolleta area. Concha's
choice for the assignment could not have been better. Already well
thought of by the Navajos, Troncoso took pains to solidify the new
friendship with EI Pinto and his people. He urged the Navajos to
follow Governor Concha's orders, to sever military and commercial ties with the Gila Apaches and to wage war against all
Apaches. Next, Troncoso told tribal members that beca~se of the
degree to which "they imitate[d] Spanish customs, dress, foods
and ways of doing things," they were better qualified than the
other Indians of the province for Spanish favor. The lieutenant
went further still to strengthen the alliance, urging stronger commercial ties betwen Spaniards and Navajos, stressing the fact that
Navajo woven goods were highly desired in Mexico. 30
In the summer of 1788, the governor fielded one of the most formidable expeditions ever sent against the Gila Apaches. Navajos
volunteered in great numbers for this expedition, but Concha retained only twenty of them in order to reduce costs. Commenting
in his diary, Concha noted: "I kept the well-known Antonio el
Pinto and nineteen of his family group which is composed of some
of the most vigorous individuals and best acquainted with the territory to which we are proceeding. "31
EI Pinto's presence on and contributions to this' expedition
accomplished the goal of separation of the Navajos and Gila
Apaches and cemented the Spanish-Navajo alliance. Later, in explaining this diplomatic achievement, Concha wrote to his successor that the Navajos' "origin is Apache, and as such they have
always been allied and united with the bands of this group which
inhabit the Sierra of Gila and Mimbres, destroying and assaulting
the provinces of New Mexico, Vizcaya, and Sonora, until the year
1788, when I attained their separation and also set them against
their former allies in such a manner that in the present time they
wage incessant war against them,"32
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By 1789, only two years after he took office, Governor Concha
had succeeded in consolidating peace and strengthening alliances
with the Navajos, Utes, Comanches, and Jicarillas. On 17 November 1789, he sent one of his periodic reports to Chihuahua and
Mexico City, citing the "excellent state of affairs with the four
friendly nations, Comanches, Utes, Navajos and Jiciuillas. They
continue to show the best joy, harmony, and consideration. Also,
trade and commerce continues to be good. "33 With this iinproved
situation, members of these four friendly nations frequently journeyed to Santa Fe to trade. Governor Concha took pains to see
that they received "the greatest attention to their entertainment
and gratification." However, even this situation demanded careful
attention and planning.
When several members of the peaceful tribes visited Santa Fe at
the same time, Concha entrusted some person with their maintenance and meals. For this, he credited each Indian with two reales
for each day spent in the city, stipulating that members of the different tribes were not to be lodged together. As soon as the Indians
prepared to return to their camps, they were given clothing,
orange paint, mirrors, knives, indigo, cigars, and other gifts. Importantly, the governor stressed that in these gifts the Comanches
were preferred, provided that they were not in attendance with
other tribes. If they were in Santa Fe while other tribes were present, distribution of these gifts was equal so that favoritism would
not result in jealousies.
Concha handed out these gifts himself, and while doing so commented on the merits and virtues of the individuals who were
receiving them. Gift distribution was performed with prudence
and economy, though it passed as munificence. Concha summarized this gift-giving diplomacy by stating: "Bearing in mind
that the good treatment and generosity in these expressions is the
principal axis upon which must revolve and has revolved in my
time the good harmony which has been preserved and must be
preserved with them."34
While the process of peace and alliance bore fruit with the four
friendly tribes, Concha concerned himself with other provisions of
Galvez's policy regarding reduction or extermination of hostile
Apaches. The governor implemented this policy to fit the situation
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in New Mexico. By 1789, continuous allied campaigns against
Apaches began to produce favorable results. Some groups solicited
peace, and Concha supplied them with trade goods and agricultural instruments. Although the governor did not take exception to
handing out food rations at presidios, he strongly advocated transforming Apaches into agrarians. Concha pressed his agrarian
policy on the viceroy: "Your excellency knows better than I that
this is the only way to achieve a lasting peace in all the Provincias
Internas. The natural. energy of the Apaches aided with
agricultural instruments and some livestock will permit them to
enjoy the advantages of a uniform, tranquil, and comfortable life,
in comparison to the one they now lead. "35
Despite putting continuous pressure on the Apaches during his
term as governor, Concha was not able to sustain military .
pressure long enough to eliminate all Apache resistance. As early
as 1787, nevertheless, some Apache groups sued for peace, even
though the Comanches opposed anything that resembled peace
with the Apaches. If the Spaniards admitted the Apaches to peace
in the province, the Comanches would have no one to fight. A contradiction arose in Galvez's program. He had ordered strict
adherence to the alliance and friendship with the Comanches,yet
if the Spaniards accepted Apache peace offerings, the Comanche
agreement would be jeopardized. 36 Commandant General Ugarte
solved the impasse for Concha, forbidding him to grant peace
with "Gila, Faroan, Mescalero, Lipiyane, Lipan, or any other"
Apache group.37 Ugarte believed that the Apaches had no intention of abiding by an agreement.
Viceroy Antonio Florez overruled Ugarte, ordering "the concession of Peace to the enemy Indians who solicit it. "38 Concha heartily agreed with Florez's dictum and encouraged Apache groups in
his province to seek peace. Although Ugarte's order that forbade
Concha to negotiate was still in effect, the governor embarked
upon his program for peace. In the fall of 1789, Concha proposed
several conditions for peace with Apaches, stressing that it would
cost the Royal Treasury virtually nothing.
Primarily, the Apaches had to promise not to attack any Spanish or allied Indian establishment in any of the northern provinces.
Also, they had to agree to a six-month truce period in which Con-
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cha would not attack them, unless they broke the truce. Finally, at
the end of two months, their captains were required to come to
Santa Fe to reaffirm the conditions of peace and report on their
tribal members who did notabide by the conditions of peace. Concha thought the six-month testing period would give Apaches
enough time to prove their good faith and to convince Commandant General Ugarte that total peace with all tribes in New Mexico was possible. 39
Ugarte reluctantly assented to Concha's program for peace, but
warned him not to attempt to make peace with eastern Apache
groups or to take any rash action that might endanger the province. In the fall of 1789, two Apache captains, whose rancherias
had suffered dozens of Spanish attacks, asked Concha for peace.
Concha quickly agreed, and the Apache captains told the governor they planned to call a council in the Gila-Sierra Blanca region
to d.iscuss, with other Apache leaders, a possible peace with the
Spaniards. 40
The initial testing period went well. To the end of the six-month
period the Apaches remained at peace. Another Apache group,
hearing of this arrangement, sent emissaries to Santa Fe to confer
with Concha. After hearing his proposals, this second group decided not to seek peace, for they had little confidence in the Spaniards. By mid-1790, however, these Apache chiefs began visiting
Santa Fe to trade, and by late summer, Concha had convinced
four leaders representing San Mateo, Sierras de Gila, Ladrones,
Magdalenas, Tecolote, Fray Cristobal, EI Cavallo, Robledo, and
Mimbres to accept a peace pact. 41
The Apache chiefs agreed to the seven-part treaty that drew military, social, and political concessions from them. Among the provisions, Apaches were to conserve peace and report any signs of
enemy intrusions to the nearest jurisdiction. Also, they had to join
the Spaniards in pursuit of aggressors and present themselves immediately when the governor called upon them. Concha even restricted their living space, ordering chiefs and their followers to
establish themselves along the Rio Grande between La Cebolla
and Socorro. The final stipulation of the agreement reflected
Concha's favorite recommendation. Upon settlement in their des-
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ignated areas, Apaches were to receive "all kinds of seeds and
workmen" so they could begin planting the following season. Concha noted: "In successive years implements which they need for
the undertaking will be supplied them, just as it is practiced with
the Navajos and Jicarillas, Apaches like themselves. "42
At least temporarily Concha's policy benefitted not only New
Mexico but also the contiguous provinces on the northern frontier.
By late 1790, he informed Commandant General Ugarte that the
Apaches in these newly formed settlements remained at peace and
were becoming confident of Spanish intentions. 43 In 1791 the
governor helped with their spring crop planting. Meanwhile, a
new commandant general, Pedro de Nava, arrived in Chihuahua.
Nava approved of Concha's work and encouraged him to continue. 44 He had little doubt that Concha could reduce all Apaches
to peace by the fall of 1791. 45
Concha next undertook the task of consolidating the peaceful
Apaches into one settlement. By the end of his term of office,
nearly 300 Apaches from the Natage, Faroan, Mimbres, and Gila
bands resided at Sabinal in the southern part of the province. Concha gave them weekly rations of corn and meat and allowed them
to leave the settlement to gather mescal. He even employed the
assistance of Spanish residents of Sabinal, who periodically aided
Apaches in their agricultural pursuits. In assessing his peace program with the Apaches, Concha indicated to his successor, Governor Fernando Chacon, "I managed to reduce and place in a
peaceful condition in the vicinity of Sabinal a large portion of the
Apache tribe. "46
During this period of balance-of-power diplomacy, physical
maladies increasingly hindered Concha. At least by 1791, he was
suffering from an irritating eye ailment. Twice he asked Viceroy
Revillagigedo for permission to go to the army hospital in Chihuahua, but the viceroy refused consent, fearing that Concha's
absence might be disruptive. By 1793, Concha's eyes were so
bothersome tha t Revillagigedo granted the governor permission to
travel south with the annual pack train to receive medical attention. He urged Concha not to be gone long for fear that an interim
commander might disturb the good peace that had been estab-
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lished. 47 With ailing eyes and broken health after six years of strenuous service Concha rode south with the pack train, never to
return.
In the summer of 1794, Don Fernando Chacon arrived in Santa
Fe and took over as governor of New Mexico. Viceroy Revillagigedo's fears of losing the peace Concha had established in New
Mexico were soon realized. Spanish-Apache relations deteriorated, and by late 1794, Apaches were deserting the Sabinal settlement. Governor Chacon could never bring the Apaches back to
Sabinal, nor could he reconsolidate the gains Concha had made
with the other tribes of the province. 48
Concha's accomplishments in Indian diplomacy and pacification of the province were attained within the guidelines of Spanish
colonial Indian policy. Three distinct factors influenced the direction of Concha's program: Bernardo de Galvez's plan of combining the offensive policy of Croix and the conciliatory program of
Jose de Galvez, Juan Bautista de Anza's successful policies and
methods, and his own predilections on how peace could be best
consolidated and maintained with the Indians of New Mexico.
Concha, like Bernardo de Galvez, realized that warfare alone
against the Apaches could not force them to surrender and live
peacefully. Galvez knew and Concha learned that the presidials
and militia were small in number, ill-trained and poorly equipped.
Concha ruefully described his situation in face of the Apache
threat: "The officers do not have other duties than making war
against the Apaches; and, because of the climate, this cannot be
carried on except during four months of the year, so they live in
complete comfort and almost total inaction. "49 Yet while Galvez
openly advocated the extermination of the Apaches, Concha
worked hard at realizing Galvez's other option, peace through
trade and a sedentary way of life. Peace, he thought, was surely
less expensive and more desirable than war.
Governor Concha successfully e~ecuted the Indian policy that
Viceroy Bernardo. de Galvez promulgated. Peace and alliances
with the Comanches, Utes, Navajos, and Jicarillas were continued
while Apaches were forced to seek peace and depend on the Spaniards. When intertribal squabbles arose, Concha administered justice and quickly relieved tensions. His successful execution of
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balance-of-power diplomacy gave New Mexico a brief period of
relative peace, prosperity, and growth. New Mexico's population
of Spaniards and mixed bloods grew from nearly 21,000 in 1786
to more than 34,000 in 1793, the highest rate of growth in the
province in any six-year period of Spanish colonial rule. 50 But
when Concha left the province in 1793, the season of peace, prosperity, and growth left with him. His imaginative implementation
of the Spanish Indian policy of conciliation neutralized vexing
problems, and much like his more famous predecessor, he won the
trust and respect of the Indians of the province. Though unfamiliar with New Mexico and its Indian problems at the outset of
his term, Concha proceeded' cautiously and made no blunders that
would jeopardize tenuous alliances. Despite poor health toward
the end of his term, he served loyally and effectively as governor of
a troubled province.
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